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The  Age-Shift:  psychodynamic  observations  on  social  policy,  ageism  and  the 
reconstruction of the adult lifecourse.
Abstract.
Through a critical engagement with policy trends, we ask how shifts in ideologies of 
ageing might influence the possibilities available to adults as they grow older.  Of 
particular interest are the implications for how people are being encouraged to think 
about  the  adult  lifecourse.  We  address  these  questions  by  looking  at  policy 
development,  taking the  2000-2005 period in  the UK, as a  case example,  and by 
comparing this period to wider regional and international trends. Finally, we assess 
the implications of contemporary policy, from a psychodynamic point of view, for the 
maintenance of a viable identity in later life and for intergenerational relationships.
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Introduction.
It has been argued, in the social science literature, that we are currently living through 
a shift in the definition of midlife and old age (Polikva, 2001; Longino and Powell,  
2002). There are a number of factors contributing to this conclusion. A loosening of 
the traditional life course boundaries associated with retirement (Phillipson,1998) is 
one  trend  that  means  that  rather  than  having  a  ‘point  of  no  return’   people  are 
increasingly experimenting with part time work roles up to and beyond traditional 
retirement age. There may also be a shift in thinking about personal potential in later 
life (Biggs, 2001) where, rather than thinking of it as a period of inevitable decline, it 
is  associated  with  the  emergence  of  a  more  individuated  ‘mature  imagination’. 
Further,  a  distinctive  group  of  ‘grey’  consumers  is  emerging,  giving  rise  to  the 
proposition that today’s older adults are creating new lifestyles to grow old by (Metz 
and Underwood, 2005; Gilleard and Higgs, 2005). The perception that the current 
generation is a healthier and potentially more productive group than its predecessors 
(Phillipson and Smith, 2005) has added to an ‘age-shift’ whereby adult ageing will be 
both more flexible and less threatening to the majority of the adult population. 
Social Policy constitutes both a reflection and an attempt to influence this shift to new 
forms of age-experience. This occurs through the definition new forms of legitimacy 
and  achieving  a  different  balance  between  age-ascribed  behaviours  and  the 
distribution of responsibilities between the state, its citizens and corporate interests. 
As policy develops,  it  is  important  to examine the re-construction of later  life,  as 
attempts are made to fix a new series of expectations around age.  Within each Policy, 
there lie a series of assumptions about the everyday reality inhabited by individuals, 
groups and populations  that  it  is  aimed to influence.  Sometimes  these themes are 
explicitly  identified  in  the  text,  and  sometimes  they  are  only  tacitly  available 
following detailed analysis and reflection. However visible these themes may be, they 
create a series of interdependent premises that, taken together, contribute to a sense of 
‘legitimate reality’ through which one can identify with ‘the grey consumer’, become 
‘an older worker’ or behave as a ‘child of the sixties’ is generally expected to in later 
life. 
It has been suggested elsewhere (Biggs & Powell, 2001) that contemporary policies 
on adult ageing have shifted away from concern with particular social hazards and 
towards the engineering of a more global meaning surrounding ‘how to age well’. 
They are, in other words, an attempt to shape a new sort of ageing citizen who is more 
in tune with changing population trends. This attempt has taken a number of forms, 
which would have seemed extraordinary only a decade ago. If recent developments in 
social policy constitute an attempt to fix a new set of behaviours and expectations for 
an ageing society, a critical assessment is needed of the forms taken by policy and any 
implications  for  what  will  become  new  standards  to  ‘age  well’  by.   As  novel 
understandings  of  adult  ageing  develop,  it  is  important  to  ask  how  they  might 
influence the ‘dynamics’ of ageing and influence how people think about themselves 
and about inter-generational relationships.
The New Face of Ageing
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Events around the turn of the Millennium have crystallised a new version of ageing 
that  is  reflected  in  policy  statements  at  national  and  international  levels.  These 
policies indicate a succession of moves that are increasingly explicit in formulating 
expectations  of  the  second  half  of  life  that  are  markedly  different  to  what  had 
previously existed (Sidorenko and Walker, 2004). 
Should anyone doubt the sea change that has occurred, they need only compare two 
statements, twenty years apart, which stand as attempts to summarise contemporary 
thinking on the nature of old age and the contribution of older people to wider society.
In 1982,  the ‘First  World  Assembly on Ageing’  was held in  Vienna.  The Vienna 
statement  underlined  three  factors  that  will  increasingly  impinge  upon  population 
structures by 2025. These include: a marked increase in the numbers of people over 
60 and over 80 years old, of which the largest proportion will be women, that both 
developed and developing nations will be effected and that policy will have to change 
significantly ‘during the first quarter of the 21st Century’. The Assembly concluded 
that:
‘Measures for the optimum utilisation of the wisdom and expertise of elderly 
individuals will be considered’ … ‘the human race is characterised by a long 
childhood and by a long old age. Throughout history this has enabled older 
persons  to  educate  the  younger  and  pass  on  values  to  them,  this  role  has 
ensured man’s survival and progress’…’A longer life provides humans with 
an opportunity to examine their lives in retrospect, to correct some of their 
mistakes, to get closer to the truth and to achieve a different understanding of 
the sense and value of their actions’ (1982:1.B)
Vienna’s final statement may be seen in retrospect to illustrate a relatively gentle view 
of ageing, with an emphasis on reflection, wisdom, a sense of summing up and benign 
disengagement.  It  is  typical  of  that  historical  period and echoes the work of  Erik 
Erikson (1982) among others in focussing on a generative relationship to younger 
age-groups and the transmission of life experience. It also recognises that there may 
be significant differences that mark out the priorities of this from other parts of the 
adult lifecourse.
While the demographic projections of 1982 are undisputed, in 2002 a ‘Second World 
Assembly on Ageing’ (this time held in Madrid) shows how a very different vision of 
later life had taken hold, best exemplified by Article 10. Here:
‘the potential of older persons is a powerful basis for future development. This 
enables society to rely increasingly on the skills, experience and wisdom of 
older persons, not only to take the lead in their own betterment but also to 
participate actively in that of society as a whole’ (2002:2).
Article 12 identifies ‘satisfying and productive work’ as a key element in this new 
route to empowerment. 
The  form  of  social  inclusion  envisaged  by  the  two  statements  is  therefore  very 
different. One appears as a personal task looking backwards via a sifting of accrued 
experience, the second privileges the application of particular skills in the here and 
now, as a springboard for future aspirations, based around continued work-activities. 
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By 2002, there appear to be significantly fewer qualities that are distinctive to later 
life and significantly greater similarity between adult age groups.
Social  Gerontologists,  such as  Gilleard  and Higgs  (2000,  2005),  have  highlighted 
changes arising as the majority of retired people become increasingly better off both 
absolutely and relative to the working population. These changes are thought to be a 
result  of  private  and  occupational  pension  schemes,  which  have  both  increased 
inequality  within  the  ageing  population  (so  that  it  reflects  the  same  patterns  of 
inequality  evident  in  wider  society),  and have  fuelled  an  extraordinary  growth of 
lifestyle  consumerism amongst  approximately  two thirds  of  older  people.  The net 
result, they argue, is that there are now fewer differences between working and retired 
populations. In the words of Andrew Blaikie, from Aberdeen University:
 “Older citizens are encouraged not just to dress ‘young’ and look youthful, 
but to exercise,  have sex, take holidays,  socialise in ways indistinguishable 
from  those  of  their  children’s  generation.  There  are  no  rules  now,  only 
choices”. (Blaikie, 1999:104).
How to age successfully has become associated, as Featherstone and Hepworth (1983) 
identified early on in this debate, with the indefinite maintenance of  ‘Midlife-styles’ 
fuelled by a continuing engagement with consumer society. Anything that threatens 
that ability to consume therefore becomes a threat to maintaining a mature identity, 
very much as the inability to work had for earlier generations. 
Rightly or wrongly, popular culture has come to associate these changes with a new 
sort of adult lifecourse, marked by an unwillingness to ‘grow old’, identification with 
more  youthful  cohorts,  the  avoidance  of  bodily  ageing,  culminating  in  a  much 
announced blurring of life-stages (Biggs 2005).  Nobody,  it  seems;  in the sense of 
dependency,  withdrawal  from society,  plus  a  limited  ability  to  both  produce  and 
consume; is old anymore.
Redefining the Adult Lifecourse through ‘Opportunity Age’
The trends identified above, that older people are richer, fitter and more similar to the 
rest  of  the  adult  population  than  ever  before,  has  been  picked  up  by  the  UK 
Government. This is most noticeable in the ‘joined-up’ strategy document on ageing 
entitled Opportunity Age (DWP, 2005). Opportunity Age is important because it tries 
to summarise and draw together thinking and policy across Government departments 
and thereby create a standard picture of adult ageing for the nation state.  Here one 
finds a series of important changes in the scope and qualities associated with mid and 
older adulthood.
Three  themes  can  be  identified  within  UK  policy  discourse,  which  constitute  an 
attempt to re-engineer a shift to a new ‘reality’ of ageing. First the use of the label 
‘older  people’  has  become much  more  imprecise,  so  that  it  can  include  the  very 
different lifecourse circumstances of people in their fifties as well as those in their 
eighties.  Second,  older  people  are  becoming re-defined as  being  little  different  to 
other  age  groups.  Third,  and  perhaps  most  extra-ordinarily,  it  is  claimed  that 
differences based on age are a result of wrong attitudes.
 
1. A Drift to ‘fifty plus’ and inclusion through work.
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A striking characteristic of contemporary UK policy is a consistent attempt to drive 
down the age at which parts of the population are considered ‘older’, in a move to cast 
the debate in  terms of a  ‘50 plus’ life-course.  This also helps  blur the distinction 
between parts of the lifecourse spent in work and in leisure. As UK policy has been 
marked by trends that push down the age of people affected by policies for ‘older 
people’ such that it effectively includes everyone over the age of  fifty, an ‘age-drift’ 
has taken place. Mid-life adults are now categorised as ‘older’ and the ‘baby boomer’ 
cohort who to paraphrase Roger Daltry of The Who ‘hoped they die before they grew 
old’,  now find themselves  aged by policy.  Indeed since 2000, ‘Life  begins at  50’ 
(Department  of  Social  Security),  ‘Action  on  Age’  (Department  of  Education  & 
Employment), ‘Our present for the Future’ and the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office’s 
own ‘Winning the Generation Game’ (WtGG) have all taken 50 years and above as 
their benchmark. So, by 2005 and an attempt to pull disparate policies together in the 
shape of ‘Opportunity Age’, ‘Fifty plus’ rather than state retirement age, had become 
the gold standard for an ageing society. Opportunity Age is significant, because, it’s 
target age-range consistently refers to of ’50 upwards’, ‘after age 50’ and ‘people over 
50’, and the focus of the document is to emphasise the possibility that this new richer 
and fitter generation can, and it is claimed want to, carry on working.
‘In the years after 50 we all want three main things: the opportunity to 
continue our career, or the choice of starting a new one that better suits our 
family circumstances; to play a full and active role in society, with an 
adequate income and decent housing; and later to keep independence and 
control over our lives as we grow older, even if we are constrained by the 
health problems that sometimes affect the final years’ (Opportunity Age, Ch1: 
31.3). 
Leaving aside for the moment the use of ‘we’ by policy-makers of an unspecified age,
the route to social inclusion is mapped out so as to encourage work and work-like 
activities, such as volunteering. In so doing, the ‘burden’ of too many pensioners and 
too few workers is turned into a virtuous circle of greater numbers of older tax paying 
workers and fewer pensions claimants.
2. The erasure of generational difference.
‘Opportunity Age’ is explicit in wanting to:
  ‘Effect real change in society as a whole …(and )… to secure the wider 
cultural changes’, such that ‘It is time to ask whether society needs to rethink 
attitudes  to  the last  third of  life  that  are  rooted  in  the  limited  horizons of 
previous generations’. (PM’s Forward P.1-2)
The development of a new culture of ageing is underpinned by a series of claims 
about  the  erasure  of  difference  between  adults  of  different  ages.   Affluence,  for 
example,  is  at  first  linked  to  general  health,  and  then  used  to  mark  a  growing 
similarity of patterns across different age-groups:
“ They are healthier; they are making an economic contribution – there are 
around 1 million workers over State Pension Age; and they are breaking with 
the notion that old age and poverty are synonymous –pensioners are no longer 
any more likely to be poor than younger people”.(PMs Forward p2) 
5
And while the explicit message is political such that:
Today’s older people are better off than preceding generations, and our 
policies over the last eight years have broken the longstanding link between 
being a pensioner and being in poverty. (2005,Ch1:1)
On  the  question  of  affluence,  these  statements  appear  to  have  an  affinity  with 
gerontological  research.  However,  the  relationship  is  fleeting.  For  the  record: 
evidence indicates  that the distribution of wealth and poverty between retired and 
non-retired parts of the population is becoming similar, and that therefore divisions of 
affluence and poverty are no longer related to age (Gilleard and Higgs, 2005). There 
is little in that conclusion to indicate that all adults are now all affluent, it simply 
shows that you are as likely to be poor or rich whether you are young or old. Other 
research,  shows  that  considerable  numbers  of  older  people  are  socially  excluded 
because they live in poor neighbourhoods and on low incomes (Scharf et al 2004, Age 
Concern, 2005). The assertion that age is no longer associated with poverty and that in 
terms  of  wealth  and disposable income retired  and working populations  share the 
same profiles is presented as an achievement, but perhaps it also reflects a much more 
familiar interpretation: the persistence of inequalities into later life. This approach to 
the question of an ageing population is curiously negligent of cumulative inequality 
engendered by the conditions experienced during working life (see Dannefer, 2003). 
In this last regard, the claim not only erases differences between age groups, it ignores 
the effects of lifecourse experience.  
The economic discourse outlined above also contributes to a more subtle process of 
erasing  distinctions  between  generations  and  can  be  added  to  a  number  of  other 
statements about intergenerational similarity that arise in different forms, including 
the need for health and social care. In terms of care provision, the curious claim is 
made that 
‘When 40 per cent of the population is aged 50 or more – as will soon be the 
case  –  the  distinction  between  services  for  older  people  and  services  for 
everyone loses significance. (2005:10). 
This statement arises from the view that older people are becoming more healthy as a 
group, and that  the  balance between younger  and older  adults  is  changing,  yet  is 
extraordinary in homogenizing the health care needs of people of widely different 
ages.
Taken  together,  these  statements  suggest  an  infatuation  with  a  ’blurring’  of  the 
lifecourse, which may typify a particular form of midlife-style thinking (Featherstone 
and Hepworth, 1989). It can also seriously undermines a recognition that capacity 
changes with age and that as Smith and Baltes (2002) have warned, support a cultural 
unwillingness  to  recognise  the  presence  of  a  ‘fourth’  age  in  which  physical  and 
mental decline takes place. 
3. Age is in the mind.
In the PM’s introduction to ‘Opportunity Age’ we are told that:
‘ For government, the challenge is to change attitudes and preconceptions
about what an ageing society means … we must explode the myth that ageing 
is a barrier to a positive contribution to the economy and society, through 
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work and through active engagement in the community…..‘ For all of us, 
dealing successfully with demographic change means shedding outdated 
stereotypes and changing mindsets about retirement and the process of 
growing older’. (2005:1)
Unfortunately, it is but a short step from seeing age as a matter of culture and a 
solution in combating ageism, to seeing age itself as a problem of attitude, and 
eventually as simply a state of mind.
In Chapter One the reader is told that with so much more of life being lived after age 
50, people from all walks of life ‘need to adjust perspectives conditioned by old-
fashioned views’. And by the time we have reached Vol 2 on  ‘Evidence’, it is 
poosible to find a seemingly extraordinary claim that: 
‘Perceptions of ageing and old age depend on where you stand. To a teenager, 
a person in his or her 30s is old. But many people even in their 70s and 80s do 
not regard themselves as old and reject being labelled according to their 
chronological age. Many people would agree, therefore, that old age is a state 
of mind rather than a fixed chronological point. (2005 Vol 2:1).  
The task of ‘transforming cultural stereotypes’ is now seen to be ‘including those 
among older people themselves’ (Executive Summary, 2005:10). even though 
‘today’s older people are already challenging old preconceptions’
 
So, ‘old fashioned’ views and ‘old preconceptions’ and the ‘limited horizons of 
previous generations’ must not be allowed to stand in the way of the forward march of 
an ageless culture, even when they may not fit with the beliefs of older people 
themselves. Extending the agenda from emancipation to combating illusions held by 
older people themselves- opens door to discrediting distinctive age characteristics and 
for personal narratives and experience to conform to the policy ideal. We are 
suffering, then, from a poverty of attitudes rather than of disposable wealth, or a 
failing body. And, rather like that well worn simplification of psychoanalysis: if you 
disagree you are probably simply unconscious of your own erroneous attitude.
A Shift Toward Generational Sameness
It  appears  from the  above  reading  of  ‘Opportunity  Age’,  that  while  demographic 
change heralds  a  new period  in  the  lifecourse  with more  complex  transitions,  for 
example between work, leisure and poverty,  the policy response has been to close 
down  options  in  the  sense  of  stressing  work  and  production  over  leisure  and 
consumption. Shifting the age associated with the term ‘older people’ and minimising 
the differences between generations, support a definition of legitimate social inclusion 
through work. Dressed in the rhetoric of ‘independence, opportunity and choice’ that 
‘should be achievable at  all ages of life’,  these latter-day rebels are not, however, 
without a cause. The new flexibility of ‘midlifestyle’ has become fixed again, and 
everyone, it appears, is heading off to work.
Taken together  these changes  reflect  a desire  to  manage a  situation in  which age 
differences are becoming increasingly blurred and that within-age diversity is as great 
at that between ages. There is also the rather disturbing political claim, at least in UK 
policy,  that late-life poverty has been pretty much abolished. Generational blurring 
and assumed fiscal solvency are not the same, yet both feed into an agenda that shifts 
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generations  away  from  distinctiveness  and  toward  similarity.  This  tendency  to 
collapse  social  engagement  and  personal  meaning  into  work  activity  assumes  no 
tension between personal  development  and social  engagement,  nor  between social 
engagement and productive age roles. They are all  rolled into one. As such, work 
entrenches its established disciplinary role ever more deeply into the lifecourse and in 
so doing is provoking a denial of difference between generations.  Policy on ageing 
has become a mechanism for bringing multiple  selves under control,  allowing the 
prioritising  of  competing  roles  and  demands,  and  conferring  legitimacy  on  some 
activities and not others, few of which are related to distinctive experiences of ageing.
Simple Generational States of Mind, Ageism and Intergenerational Relations.
In terms of the dynamics of ageing, what is striking about the current policy position 
is that: First, rather than recognizing difference, the position taken appears to wish to 
deny age- based diversity. Second this denial takes the form of avoiding recognition 
of the less palatable challenges that old age can bring. Third, it appears that they are 
being replaced by the priorities mid life adulthood. And fourth, the claim that any 
residual differences are the result of a ‘state of mind’.
Of course, states of mind are the staple of any critical psychodynamic approach and 
something that psychodynamic thinking should have a view on. Chris Bollas (1992), 
in his analysis of the distinction between simple and complex states of mind observes 
that:
 ‘The simple experiencing self and the complex reflecting self enable the 
person to process life according to different, yet interdependent modes of 
engagement; one immersive the other reflective’. (1992:15)
According to Bollas, the complex self reflectively objectifies parts of itself within its 
own mind and thereby allows a certain critical distance and control over interpersonal 
activity. Simple self-states are caught up in immediate experience, instinct and 
feeling. As such, simple states are ones in which social definitions are accepted at face 
value and are obscured in so far as they are assumed to be held in common. Whilst in 
a complex state, however, the self is observed as an object and engagement with ‘deep 
experiencing’ can take place.  This distinction is relevant to an ability to recognize 
and tolerate difference and in making a bridge between generations. We are lucky that 
Bollas continues by discussing the sophistication with which the self is managed in 
later life, and the capacity to put oneself in the place of another, elaborated in the 
8
context of generational belonging. The tension between simple and complex states of 
mind is particularly acute, and therefore sensitised to psychological processes of 
avoidance and denial, when new generational definitions are experienced. When a 
generation emerges, it carries its members along in an unreflective collective process- 
a time for the simple self. However, in the course of generational progression, Bollas 
argues that individuals become less immersed in social culture, and increasingly 
inclined to see the self and others more clearly. While the policy positions that have 
been analysed above are dealing with transition and redefinition of generational 
consciousness, it is instructive to note a tendency to eclipse the experience of 
alternative generational positions.
If imbalances in power between generations are also taken into account, the simple 
immersive state of mind can be seen to be an expression of generational dominance, 
in so far as there is little perceived need to look beyond the requirements of the 
generationally more powerful group. Rather than reducing forms of age-prejudice 
through sameness, the way is opened, however, for a new type of social ageism based 
on the avoidance of difference between adult age groups. There are dangers in a 
policy shift that appears to so value the activities traditionally associated with one part 
of the lifecourse and denies the priorities of others. Rather than freeing older adults 
from age discrimination, the ‘new ageing’ associated with these policies, may 
reproduce a form of age-imperialism through ‘the imposition of the goals, aims, 
priorities and agendas of one age group onto and into the lives of other age groups’ 
(Biggs 2004: 103).
If the dominant ideology wishes us to see older adults as all the same, then rather than 
seeing  difference  as  the  source  of  ageism,  it  is  important  to  interrogate  this 
assumption  of  similarity  and  ask  what  we  are  missing  and  how  this  inhibits 
recognition  of  the  special  qualities  of  a  different  generational  experience.   Most 
notable here would be experiences based on special existential needs in later life and 
topics that run against new social norms that legitimate only certain forms of ageing. 
The current  trend certainly reflects  the qualities  associated with this  phenomenon, 
which can appear as simple common sense to the dominant age group, fuelled by 
political or economic expediency. The danger being that if older adults end up on the 
wrong side of this equation, life is lived according to principles that are out of step 
with their emerging life priorities. Seeing differences between generations as a ‘state 
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of mind’ may itself be part of a wider pattern of avoiding complexity and the need to 
tolerate age-based distinctiveness.
This approach to generational relations, then, also obscures a second core issue arising 
from psychoanalytic thinking: the rivalry between generations and how this can be 
resolved. In terms of intergenerational relations, a superficial assumption of sameness 
would  significantly  underplay  the  impact  of  intergenerational  conflict  in 
circumstances where different generational groups are being expected to increasingly 
compete on the same turf. In terms of generational relations,  the current discourse 
appears  to  be  un-conversant  with  the  risks  associated  with  denying  differences 
between age-groups. Gullete (2004) outlines these risks as including an erosion of 
‘seniority’ at work and the expectation that different generations compete under the 
same ground rules, both of which significantly erode workplace benefits for workers 
as they grow older. She claims that reducing generational differences at work actually 
increases competition between generations and reduces inter-generational solidarity. 
Unfortunately, in current historical circumstances, this dovetails neatly with cultural 
fantasies of never growing old. In policy terms, a picture is painted of a sameness of 
quality and aspiration across different age-groups, a tendency to assume that adults of 
different  ages  desire  the  same forms of  social  participation  and self-development, 
plus, a levelling down of the diversity of social experience to the workplace. Rather 
than freeing older adults from age discrimination, this new life-plan, may reproduce a 
new form in which the imposition of the goals, aims, priorities and agendas of one age 
group are extended onto and into the lives of other age groups with little consideration 
is being given to differences in aspiration associated with particular age-cohorts or 
parts of the adult lifecourse and to an avoidance of the physical realities of later life.
Conclusions.
Contemporary societies find themselves at a turning point in what it means to become 
old. The much hoped for fluidity of new cultures of ageing is becoming fixed again, 
as successive waves of policy discourse legitimise a new definition of the social value 
of later life.  While at some levels this may reduce the differential treatment of people 
based on age,  it  also constitutes  a denial  of the  special  qualities  of  later  life.  An 
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understanding of psychodynamic processes might help explain some of the effects of 
new social  policies  that  are  aimed  at  changing  the  way adult  ageing is  generally 
perceived.  In  particular,  making  a  distinction  between  simple  and  complex 
generational  states  of  mind  and  re-discovering  the  possibility  of  intergenerational 
rivalry may lead to a new understanding of the processes of social ageism, adapted to 
new ideological circumstances. 
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